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Michael R. Williams and Aaron P. Jackson, Ph.D.
Brigham Young University

I

n the book, Deep River, Shusaku Endo (1994), tells
a story of Japanese tourists visiting the Ganges River in India. Each of the main characters has had significant experiences that brought them to India, either
to find someone, find answers, or to find closure. The
overarching theme of the novel revolves around both
the clashes between Japanese and Indian cultural values, and the diversity of experiences, values, and interpersonal conflicts within this seemingly homogenous
group of Japanese tourists. The story of one of these
tourists, a man named Isobe, provides an interesting
literary example of tolerance for human diversity.
The book details the experience of Isobe and his wife,
who is dying from cancer. His wife’s illness catches
Isobe off-guard and he begins feeling a sense of regret
as he looks back at his life and marriage. Specifically,
he regrets not being able to meaningfully communicate with his wife until she was put in the hospital.
On her deathbed, Isobe’s wife whispered something
to her husband that drove him to travel with the other
tourists to India.
While in India, Isobe laments the relationship he
had with his wife:
“’Darling!’ he cried out. ‘Where have you gone?’
He had never called to his wife with such raw feeling while she had been alive. Like many men, he had
been absorbed in his work, and had often ignored his
household until the time of her death. It wasn’t that
he had not loved her. He had long felt that being alive
meant first of all work, and working diligently, and

that women were happy to have such husbands. Not
once had he wondered what depths of affection for
him were buried in his wife’s heart. And he had no notion of how strong were the bonds linking him to her
in the midst of his complacency.
But after hearing the words his wife babbled at the
moment of her death, Isobe came to understand the
meaning of irreplaceable bonds in a human being’s
life.” (Endo, 1994, pp.188)
In this passage, Isobe realizes he placed a tremendous amount of importance on acting how he thought
a husband should act. He also expected his wife to
appreciate it as an ideal wife should. Fulfilling these
expectations came at the cost of both treating and
connecting with his wife as a unique human being.
With this story in mind, we want to explore the act
of valuing people more than ideas as a way to define
tolerance. First, we’ll explore the current understanding of the word tolerance, especially in the field of
psychology. Then we will explore the philosophy of
Emmanuel Levinas to expand the definition of tolerance to include valuing a person as more important
than any idea. We propose that this new definition
will provide an alternative to mainstream psychology’s
definitions of tolerance.
Defining Tolerance
Overview

The Oxford English Dictionary defines tolerance as,
“The action or practice of enduring or sustaining pain
1
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or hardship; the power or capacity of enduring” (OED
Online, 2015). The word occupies a fairly common
place in our daily vernacular, and is a concept that
most people claim to understand well. Finding a common definition of tolerance in the field of psychology
and psychological research is more problematic. A
search on the PsychINFO database with the terms
“tolerance” and “human diversity” returned only one
article that operationally defined tolerance. Witenberg (2007), in studying children’s and adolescents’
tolerance of human diversity, defined tolerance as:

jective and that our view of others and the world will
always be affected by our personal experiences, beliefs,
culture, and background (cf. Tjeltveit, 1999). Focusing on being objective also has the danger of blinding
us to our own subjective biases. Defining tolerance
as solely rejecting prejudice speaks only of eliminating
what we perceive as negative in our relationships with
those who are different than us. Nothing is said of
how to cultivate the positive benefits that diversity can
bring into interpersonal relationships—let alone defining what criteria needs to be met for something to
be considered a prejudice. Finally, defining tolerance
as the full acceptance of others can be problematic if
we do not address what is meant by ‘full acceptance.’
These definitions beg the question, “Does valuing the
diversity of another person mean that we must also
value their behaviors, values, and ideas?”
We propose a definition of tolerance that functions
at the interpersonal level of our relationships and interactions with others. We define tolerance to mean
respecting and considering the humanity of a person
as more important than any idea or ideal we or they
may hold. To support this definition, we will explain
how the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas can be used
to counteract the problems associated with the typical
understandings of tolerance in psychological research.

“…the conscious affirmation of favourable judgments
and beliefs involving principles of justice, equality, care
and consideration for the plight of others or, more concisely, according respect and equality to others who are
different through racial characteristics, ethnicity, and
nationality.” (pp. 435)

Several years earlier, Witenberg (Robinson, Witenberg, & Sanson, 2001) highlighted the lack of consensus about how to define tolerance within psychology.
They suggested that most studies assume the reader
understands the definition of tolerance without explicitly defining the term. They went on to identify
four ways researchers have implicitly defined
tolerance.
1. Forbearance or ‘putting up with’ others.
2. A fair and objective attitude towards others who
are different from ourselves in any number of
ways.

The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas
Overview

3. A conscious rejection of prejudice.

Levinas (1998) states that our existence is primarily
ethical. He proposes that the face-to-face encounter with another human being (the other), and the
responsibility associated with that encounter, is the
foundation of our primarily ethical existence. In coming face-to-face with the other, we also come in contact with the Other—to be understood as God or the
Divine (cf. Levinas, 1998, pp. 149-152). The Other
leaves traces that we can see in the faces of the other. Coming in contact with the Other in the face of
another begins a type of non-verbal dialogue. This
exchange consists of the other’s humanity calling to
us, appealing for us to do no harm, but to serve them.
In response, the self has a moral obligation to answer
“here I am” (Levinas, 1998, p. 149). In this encounter,
there is a foundation for a new definition for tolerance.
To understand this responsibility for the other, it is

4. The full acceptance and valuing of others while
recognizing the differences between others and
oneself.
Robinson, Witenberg, & Sanson (2001) also pointed out that while each of these implicit definitions of
tolerance can be useful in a specific context, any definition comes with its own underlying problems. Defining tolerance as forbearance can make oneself a perpetual victim of the diversity of others. Forbearance
holds one’s own experience and view of the world as
most correct by default. Interactions with people who
are different from us can quickly degrade into a series
of passive-aggressive sighs, shrugs, and eye-rolls. Tolerance as a fair and objective attitude unquestioningly
assumes that unbiased objectivity is actually attainable. It fails to recognize that human beings are sub2
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helpful to first introduce Levinas’ concepts of Totality
and Infinity (Levinas, 1969).

sense of, the Other—and by extension the other—is
always infinitely beyond our total comprehension. In
Levinas’ own words,”[the Other] is not unknown but
unknowable” (Levinas, 1987, p. 75).

Totality and Infinity

Totality is the quality of being finite and comprehensible. Objects found in the real world are finite and
completely comprehensible and we are able to use or
consume these objects to satisfy our needs and wants.
For example, we can fully comprehend what constitutes a chair. We can know what it is made of, how
it was made, and that it will still be a chair in the future—in essence we can understand the totality of the
chair’s existence. Once we comprehend the chair in its
totality, we are easily able to use the chair to fulfill our
need or want to sit. The act of using an object or attempting to fully comprehend the totality of an object
is called totalizing.
In contrast to totality, infinity is the quality of not
being completely comprehensible or reducible. It is
beyond our abilities to fully comprehend what is infinite or reduce what is infinite to fit into the finite
categories and concepts that are comprehensible to
us. Attempting to do so commits totalizing violence
against what is infinite—meaning we are treating
what is infinite no different than a finite object that
exists to fulfill our needs or wants.
The Other, whose traces we find in the face of the
other, is infinite—making any person we come in contact with infinite as well. When we come face-to-face
with another person, we use the categories, ideals, and
stereotypes we have inherited from our culture and
personal background in order to understand them.
Doing this is an act of totalization, which turns an infinite being into something finite that is used to satisfy
our need for sure knowledge or certainty. For Levinas,
we are not able to have a complete and sure knowledge
about another person. Levinas compared the stereotypes and categories that we use to a “plastic image”
when he said: “the face of the Other at each moment
destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me”
(Levinas, 1988, p. 51). This is not meant to convey
the idea that we can never relate to or obtain some
level of knowledge about a person, or that meaningful
and deep interpersonal relationships are impossible.
What we do not and cannot know is the entirety of
that person’s experience with the world. Because their
experience has no finite borders to grasp and make

Responsibility to the Other

Once we understand the concepts of totality and infinity, we can better understand our responsibility to
the others we meet. For Levinas, we are first and foremost ethical beings. We feel a call to be responsible
for the other before cognitively or rationally deeming
the other as worthy or unworthy of our efforts. In the
face-to-face encounter, we are presented with a choice
to either ignore or accept the call to be responsible for
the other. Levinas tells us that there is no escape from
this choice:
“irreplaceable in responsibility, I cannot, without
defaulting, incurring fault or being caught up in some
complex, escape the face of a neighbor…” (Hand,
1989, p. 181)

In trying to escape or ignoring our responsibility, totalizing violence is committed against the other. This
totalization goes against the infinite qualities of the
other by categorizing them as not being worth our
time and efforts. Such a label eliminates the distinction between the other and any object and can lead to
the false assumption that we have the ability to define
and to pass judgment upon the value or worthiness of
a person based upon our limited knowledge of them.
Instead, Levinas argues, we are obligated to be responsible for the other for two important reasons.
First, the ‘alterity’, or otherness, of the other awakens
us to a sense of our own existence. The experience
of coming face-to-face with the other not only proves
that the other exists; it also proves that we exist. Second, seeing the Other in the face of the other makes
our obligation to the other the same as our obligation
to the Other (God). We are to honor and be responsible for the other because the Other considers the other worthy of Its essence and presence.
Levinas and Tolerance

The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas can provide
a solid foundation from which to redefine tolerance.
Levinas teaches us that trying to reduce the experiences, knowledge, character, and humanity of others
in order to fit them into labels that make sense in our
3
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view of the world is not ethical. Instead, we are reminded that the other’s true identity and experience
is always more than we can be completely comprehended. Sayre and Kunz (2005) pointed out that the
other continually, and many times unexpectedly, overflows and exceeds any previously ascribed categories
and stereotypes. Even though we can never see the
complete picture of a person, we still can answer the
call to be responsible for them. By actively attending
to humanity of someone who is different from us, we
respect and honor them as human beings before we
even begin to conceptualize the type of person that we
believe them to be. In short, the philosophy of Levinas helps us to separate the humanity of a person from
the abstract ideas that we hold about them.
In this way, we are able to escape the problems associated with defining tolerance as merely forbearance.
The idea that we are putting up with or we are victims of the diversity of others denies the humanity
of the other because it implies that we can know, and
judge their view of the world as less important than, or
threatening to, our own—thus committing totalizing
violence against them. The alternative is to recognize
that we acutely engaged in taking care of and being responsible for their needs because of their diverse and
infinite nature. In fact, it is the alterity of the other
that awakens our sense of responsibility. In a Levinasian view of tolerance, we would not suffer through
or be a victim to the diverse nature of another person;
rather, we would heed the call to respond morally to
their humanity while simultaneously condemning the
use of stereotypes.
We can also avoid the problems associated with defining tolerance as having an objective view of others.
Pure objective knowledge of another is impossible
because defining others as infinite, irreducible, and
uncategorizable makes our point of view perpetually
subjective and dynamic—matching the dynamic and
ever-changing nature of the person we have come in
contact with. The other’s alterity will always make our
conceptualization about them subjective. Accepting
our own subjectivity will also help us become more
cognizant of our own biases, and better able to recognize when we are placing totalizing stereotypes upon
an other.
While Levinas’ philosophical framework matches up
well with the definition of tolerance as rejecting prej-

udices, there are some important differences. Levinas
indeed proposed that the stereotypes and conceptualizations we form about others can be harmful, but he
also provided the criteria for what constitutes a harmful prejudice. Totalizing violence is committed when
the infinite nature of the other is reduced to being no
different than an object. Therefore, any prejudices,
stereotypes, or categories that objectify and degrade
the humanity of another person are to be considered
harmful. Levinas’ philosophy also provides an alternative to using prejudice to fill the gaps in our view of
the world. Using the concept of responsibility, we can
find a positive practice or belief to fill the gaps in our
worldview or replace discarded negative ones. Instead
of reacting to the diversity of others with prejudice, we
can respond to their diversity with the moral obligation to care for and do no harm.
Finally, we come to one of the most difficult questions about tolerance: does defining tolerance as the
full acceptance and valuing of others mean accepting
and valuing the ideas, behaviors, and values of others?
Levinas’ philosophy of the other makes one important
distinction that can help answer this question. This
distinction is between the humanity of a person—
their most basic alterity—and the abstract ideas and
concepts that we hold about them. We believe this
distinction can also be applied to our obligation towards the other by saying we are responsible for the
other despite what they may believe or how they may
behave. It does not matter how we conceptualize the
other’s worthiness of help—based in their attitudes,
actions, or cultural beliefs. Rather, we are first and
foremost responsible to respond to their humanity.
Most rational adults, if asked, would agree that it is
wrong to devalue a person based on the fact they are
politically liberal, believe in reincarnation, or use illicit
drugs. A more telling question would be to ask if it
is right to value a person based on the fact that they
are politically conservative, believe in Jesus Christ as
the Savior, or are law-abiding citizens. Levinas would
say both questions are missing the point. Tolerance,
in Levinasian terms, would focus on accepting and
respecting the person, and being responsible to them
without being concerned about the beliefs they hold
or the activities in which they are engaged.
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Conclusion

References

While we believe that the philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas provides a solid foundation for understanding tolerance—a foundation that remedies the current
definitional problems in psychological research—the
proposed definition is not without its challenges.
First, Levinas’ view of the world seems to be in stark
contrast with most of western civilization. The idea
that at our core we are responsible for someone other
than our self would be difficult, to say the least, for a
person from an individualistic culture to understand.
Many aspects of the dominant White culture of the
United States reinforce the idea that the individual, in
their pursuit of happiness, only has responsibility for
one’s self. Trying to reverse course on such a firmly
planted individualistic ideal may prove to be an unrealistic goal.
Another challenge to the proposed definition of tolerance deals with the inevitable abuses and manipulations that will occur when our primary responsibility
is to answer to the needs of the other. What is the
line between respecting the humanity of another, and
capitulating to their values out of obligation? How
do we prevent the other from taking advantage of our
responsibility to care for them?
Although the prospect of defining tolerance as respecting the humanity of a person more than any ideal
we or they may hold is challenging, it contains enough
potential benefit for the field of psychology that further consideration and research is merited. We look
forward to thoughtful dialogue about both the philosophical and practical challenges this notion poses.
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